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We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite
resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory
length, and as a result, different memory lengths can compete and co-exist in a dynamical equilib-
rium. Our analytical formulation makes a connection to statistical urn models, and we show that
temperature is mirrored by the agent’s memory. Our analysis is easily generalisable to many other
game models with implications that we briefly discuss.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 89.75.Fb, 05.65.+b
Introduction – All successful forms of life must eventu-
ally engage in competition for resources. The equilibrium
analysis of these competitions began with von Neumann
[1] and Nash [2]. The theory of games has since found ap-
plications in genetics, ecology, economics and sociology
[3–6]. Computational implementation of games leads to
agent-based models, which may be of particular impor-
tance in understanding the behaviour of financial systems
[6, 7]. For example, the particularly successful minority
game model [8–11], captures the competition between in-
telligent agents with a restricted form of memory. Recent
work suggest such games may be generalised leading to
clearly separated regimes of behaviour [12]. In general,
understanding the complex collective behaviour arising
from the non-linear interactions between individuals is a
major challenge for statistical physics [13, 14].
In this Letter we present a simple game model: in each
round, individual agents pick one of two urns, each of-
fering a stochastic yield to be shared by the pickers. An
agent has a memory of these payouts for the previous τ
rounds to aid its decision. Such stochastic yield shar-
ing arises in animal foraging behaviour and stock trad-
ing [15], where the urns may represent different prey
species, foraging patches, or stocks. Some form of in-
telligence is essential in order to compete [16]. As with
the minority game [8], agents’ memory in our model is
a tool for decision making. However, unlike the minor-
ity game, memory in our model is used to make direct
estimates of the highest paying choice, rather than to
second guess opponents’ next moves. In common with
the thermal minority game [10], dynamical urn models
[18], and some evolutionary games [19], our agents have
a “temperature”, which captures the level of noise in the
switches they make in search of yields. We find that the
additional noise inherent in their finite memory samples,
which is greater for shorter memories, leads the system to
behave as if its agents have a higher temperature. There-
fore, increasing memory “cools” the system. However, at
a critical memory, a Hopf bifurcation [20] emerges pro-
ducing stable cycles in the numbers of agents in each
urn. Perhaps not surprisingly, a long memory is advan-
tageous, but the presence of these cycles allows short
memory agents to compete, and a mixed memory system
will evolve toward the bifurcation point. Our theoretical
formulation follows that of statistical urn models such
as Ehrenfest’s dog flea model [21], which played an im-
portant role in the early development of statistical me-
chanics, and more recently allowed analytical investiga-
tion of effects such as slow relaxation and condensation
in nonequilibrium statistical mechanics [18].
Whilst we have restricted this Letter to a yield sharing
game, the analysis may be carried through for any so-
cial system where agents switch between strategies using
their memory to determine the optimal choice. Simple
examples include the Hawk Dove [3] and Rock Scissors
Paper [22] games. Our formulation could also accom-
modate the inclusion of topological effects and agent in-
teractions [23]. However, even without such complexities,
urn models exhibit a remarkable range of non-equilibrium
behavior that is connected with temperature [18]. Our
analysis suggests that effects such as condensation and
the emergence of order [24], which have social interpre-
tation, may also have a connection with memory [23], but
that long memory can also introduce instability.
Model definition – Consider the case of two urns and
a total of n agents. We let the urn yields, U1(t), U2(t),
at round t be random variables uniformly distributed on
[0, ωn] and [0, n] respectively, where ω > 1 so that urn
1 yields more on average than urn 2. We allow agents
access to the arithmetic mean of the last τ payoffs, but we
note that other forms of sampling could be used. Letting
φt be the fraction of agents in urn 1, then the difference
in the average payoffs between urn 1 and urn 2 is
∆t :=
1
τ
τ−1∑
s=0
[
U2(t− s)
n(1− φt−s) −
U1(t− s)
nφt−s
]
. (1)
We refer to τ as the “memory length” of the agents.
Agent dynamics is encoded in transition probabilities be-
tween urns, which are deterministic functions of ∆t. At
each round, each agent will switch urns using the proba-
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FIG. 1. Evolution of φt when n = 10
6, ω = 2, β = 10 and
ǫ = 10−6. Memory values are τ ∈ {5, 10, 50, 500} (squares,
circles, dots, triangles). Dashed lines are analytical equilib-
rium values (see equation (12)).
bilities
W1→2(∆) =
ǫ
2
[1 + tanh(β∆)] (2)
W2→1(∆) =
ǫ
2
[1− tanh(β∆)] . (3)
The parameter β, the “inverse temperature”, captures
the degree of stochasticity with which agents make
choices. For finite β, agents may decide to switch strate-
gies even though their estimate of the payoff difference is
unfavourable. In the limit β →∞ agents will only move
if their estimate of the payoff difference indicates that
the move is favourable. The parameter ǫ controls the
rate at which strategy switching takes place compared
to the rate at which yield information arrives. It may
also be seen as the frequency with which opportunities
to switch strategy arise. In the limit ǫ→ 0, at most one
agent will move at each round.
Simulation (instability) – We simulate the model for a
series of values of τ when n = 106. Two different values
of ǫ are used; in Figure 1 we have ǫ−1 = 106 ≫ τ and in
Figure 2 we have ǫ = 10−3. For ǫ = 10−6, the expected
number of moves at each step is < 1, and φ appears very
stable. For larger ǫ, φ experiences much larger fluctua-
tions about the steady state value, driven by the yield
process. For shorter memory values these fluctuations
are random, but as τ approaches ǫ−1, periodic oscilla-
tions appear and dominate. The appearance of these
stable oscillations at critical memory, τc, is known as a
Hopf bifurcation [20]. By allowing agents access only
to the mean of their memory, we implicitly assume that
changes in the expected payoff over the course of their
memory, brought about by oscillations, are too subtle
for them to infer from noise.
Simulation (coexistence) – We now investigate how
agents with two different memories compete against one
another by interpreting the payoff as reproduction rate.
We define δ and γ as the rates of death, and reproduction
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FIG. 2. Evolution of φt when n = 10
6, ω = 2, β = 5
and ǫ = 10−3. Memory values are τ ∈ {5, 50, 500} (triangles,
squares, circles). Dashed line is solution to equation (15)
when τ = 500 and ω, β, ǫ are as above.
per unit payoff, respectively. Reproduction is assumed
to occur before death in each round, but in practice the
probability of any one agent reproducing and dying in
the same round is extremely small for the γ, δ values we
choose. Letting pτi (t) be the number of agents with mem-
ory τ in urn i at time t we set the probability of birth for
an agent in urn i to be
P(birth) =
γUi(t)∑
τ p
τ
i (t)
. (4)
The death probability for each agent is set equal to δ.
If populations are fixed in size and the system is not
in an oscillatory state, then we expect that in equilib-
rium the longer memory agents will dominate the high
yielding urn. Their long memory allows them to per-
ceive smaller statistical advantages that are obscured by
noise for the short memory agents. Using the thermody-
namic analogy, the higher temperature (shorter memory)
agents are more likely to make moves which leave them
in an urn with a lower expected payoff, corresponding to
a higher “energy” state. Above zero temperature, and
in the absence of oscillations, the high yield urn will be
under-exploited, placing high memory agents at an ad-
vantage. This effect can be observed in Figure 3 where
we have simulated a mixed population of two memories
τ ∈ {10, 1000} beginning with a ratio of 10:1 short mem-
ory to long memory agents. We see that initially the
advantage afforded the long memory agents causes their
population to grow, whereas the short memory agents re-
duce in number. Were this advantage to be sustained in-
definitely then we would expect the short memory agents
to eventually disappear, but in fact the populations stabi-
lize. This effect appears because the long memory agents
cause oscillations to develop once they are in sufficiently
high concentration. In the presence of oscillations the
short memory agents have an advantage because they can
quickly observe opportunities offered by the oscillating
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FIG. 3. Scaled populations p(t) := pτ1(t) + p
τ
2(t) for τ = 10
(circles) and τ = 1000 (triangles) when n = p(0) = 106,
ǫ = 10−3, β = 4 with γ = 10−4 and δ = 2 × 10−4. Also
shown (thin black line) is evolution of variance of φt during
population dynamics simulation. Straight dashed line shows
variance of homogeneous population with the same ǫ, β, ω val-
ues at critical memory τc. Note: rapid initial equilibration of
population values (bringing birth and death into balance) is
not visible on time scale of plot.
payoffs. We therefore expect the system to evolve to the
point where oscillations are just beginning to form. We
may observe this evolution by making use of the variance
of φt as an order parameter which captures proximity to
the Hopf bifurcation point. In Figure 3 we see that at a
critical ratio of short to long memory agents, the variance
climbs rapidly, stabilizing just below the value seen in a
system where all agents have memory τc but all other
parameters are equal. In this way the Hopf bifurcation
may be viewed as a self organized state.
Analysis (equilibrium) – We consider the behaviour of
the model as ǫ→ 0, allowing us to view it as an urn model
in the Ehrenfest class [18] where agents independently
make transitions using state (φt) dependent probabilities.
Provided τ ≪ ǫ−1, the fraction φt may be approximated
by a constant φ during the window over which payoff
averaging takes place. In this case, by the central limit
theorem, the marginal distributions of ∆t for each t are
approximately normal N(∆¯, σ2/τ) where, from (1)
∆¯(φ, ω) :=
1
2
(
1
1− φ −
ω
φ
)
(5)
σ2(φ, ω)
τ
:=
1
12τ
[
ω2
φ2
+
1
(1− φ)2
]
. (6)
We now introduce a intermediate time scale T satisfying
τ ≪ T ≪ ǫ−1 and define the time average 〈·〉, over a
window of length T
〈Wi→j(∆)〉(t) := 1
T
t∑
s=t−T+1
Wi→j(∆s). (7)
This average is a random variable which, for constant φ,
has expected value E[Wi→j(∆)] where the expectation is
taken over the marginal distribution of ∆. The condition
τ ≪ T ≪ ǫ−1 ensures that φ is approximately constant
over the window and that the variance of 〈Wi→j(∆)〉 is
proportional to T−1 (because ∆t1 and ∆t2 are depen-
dent only when |t2 − t1| < τ ≪ T ). As ǫ → 0, then
assuming T is sufficiently large, the probability that an
agent will make a transition i → j during interval T
approaches T 〈Wi→j(∆)〉 ≈ TE[Wi→j(∆)], equivalent to
a memoryless (Ehrenfest class) model where transition
probabilities (2,3) are replaced with their expectations
E[Wi→j(∆)]. Averaging over the normally distributed
difference ∆ we find that
〈W1→2(∆)〉 ≈ E[W1→2(∆)] ≈ ǫ
2
[
1 + tanh(α∆¯)
]
(8)
where
α =
√
2τβ2
2τ + πβ2σ2
. (9)
To obtain this result, we have made the approximation
tanh(β∆) ≈ erf(√πβ∆/2), allowing us to make use of
the exact relationship E[erf(
√
πβ∆/2)] = erf(
√
πα∆¯/2).
The constant α acts as an effective inverse tempera-
ture and we see that increasing τ “cools” the system
closer to the inverse temperature β, and in the limit
β → ∞, α ∝ √τ . To complete our analogy to a ther-
mal urn model we now write the probability of finding
the agents in a particular arrangement, or microstate, i,
such that a fraction φ are in urn 1, as pi(φ) ∝ e−αE
where E is an “energy” function. Considering two mi-
crostates separated by a single transition, and defining
δφ = 1/n, then detailed balance requires that in equilib-
rium 2α∆¯ = ∂φ(αE)δφ. This condition allows E(φ) to
be computed, in principle, by integration. A closed form
approximation E(φ) ≈ −n ln [φω(1− φ)] is obtained by
noting that α depends weakly on φ compared to E so
that ∂φ(αE) ≈ α∂φE. Summing over all microstates cor-
responding to macrostate φ we have a Boltzmann prob-
ability distribution for φ
P(φ) =
n!
(nφ)!(n(1 − φ))!
e−α(φ)E(φ)
Z , (10)
where Z is the partition function. Taking the thermody-
namic limit n→∞, and making use of Stirling’s approx-
imation, we find that the most likely (maximum entropy)
fraction, φ¯, satisfies:
1
2n
∂
∂φ
lnP(φ) = α∆¯− 2φ+ 1 = 0. (11)
As the memory increases and the system cools we ex-
pect the agents to arrange themselves so that yields are
shared more fairly. We therefore linearize (11) about the
perfectly fair state, φ = ω/(1 + ω), where agents in both
urns receive the same expected payoff, finding that
φ¯ ≈ f(τ) +
β(1+ω)2
2
2f(τ) + β(1+ω)
3
2ω
, (12)
4where f(τ) =
√
1 + πβ2(1 + ω)2/(12τ). The accuracy
of this approximation is verified in Figure 1. For larger
values of ǫ (Figure 2) agents move more quickly so the
averaging effect (8) damps fluctuations in transition rates
less strongly, creating larger fluctuations in φt. For finite
β the system cannot reach perfect fairness for any mem-
ory length, but in the limit β →∞ where the transition
probabilities (2,3) become step functions, we have that:
φ¯ ≈ ω
ω + 1
[
1−
√
π(ω − 1)√
3τ(ω + 1)2
+O(τ−1)
]
. (13)
From this we see that the distance away from the fair
state decreases as τ−1/2 as the memory of the agents
becomes large. However, we now show why increasing τ
too far, when ǫ is finite, destabilizes the system.
Analysis (instability) – As τ increases, fluctuations in
∆t due to the yield process are reduced but for finite ǫ we
can no longer treat φt as a constant over the averaging
window. It is instructive, therefore, to study the effect of
variations in φt, neglecting the variations in yield. Pro-
moting t to a continuous variable and replacing the urn
yields with their mean values we have
∆t ≈ 1
2τ
∫ t
t−τ
[
1
1− φs −
ω
φs
]
ds. (14)
We then approximate the evolution of φt using the fol-
lowing delay differential equation:
φ˙t = (1− φt)W2→1(∆t)− φtW1→2(∆t). (15)
A numerical solution to this equation is shown in Figure
2, along with simulation results using the same parameter
values. The oscillations in the simulation are accurately
captured by (15) but the stochastic yield disrupts their
perfect periodicity. To discover the parameter values at
which stable oscillations develop we linearize equation
(15) by writing φt = φ¯ + ψt where ψt are small fluctu-
ations and φ¯ is the constant fixed point, not necessarily
stable, of equation (15). In terms of these new variables
∆t ≈ ∆¯(φ¯, ω) + 6σ
2(φ¯,
√
ω)
τ
∫ t
t−τ
ψsds (16)
where the functions ∆¯ and σ2 are defined in (5) and
(6). After expanding the tanh functions in the transition
rates to first order about ∆¯(φ¯, ω), we obtain the following
linear delay equation
ψ˙t = −ǫ
[
ψt +
A
τ
∫ t
t−τ
ψsds
]
(17)
where A = 3βsech2[β∆¯(φ¯, ω)]σ2(φ¯,
√
ω). To determine
the stability of this equation we introduce an exponential
trial solution ψt = e
λt where λ = x + iy. Substitution
into equation (17) yields a characteristic equation with
real and imaginary parts given by
x2 − y2 + ǫx+ ǫA
τ
(
1− e−τx cos τy) = 0 (18)
2xy + ǫy +
ǫA
τ
e−τx sin τy = 0. (19)
For sufficiently small memory, τ , the real part, x, of the
solutions to (18) and (19) is negative so the fixed point φ¯
is stable. As we increase τ , λ crosses through the imagi-
nary axis, creating a switch to instability with oscillations
of exponentially increasing magnitude. Although the full
equation (15) shares this transition to instability, we find
that the resulting oscillations are bounded. The appear-
ance of these stable oscillations as τ passes through a
critical value, which we denote τc, constitutes the Hopf
Bifurcation [20]. To compute τc we set x = 0 in equation
(19) so that sinc(τy) = A−1. Expanding the sinc func-
tion to second order about its root at π/τ and solving
the resulting quadratic we find that
y ≈ π
2τ
(
3−
√
1− 4A−1
)
:=
κ
τ
(20)
which defines a new constant κ. Substitution of this so-
lution into (18), yields the following expression for the
critical memory length
τc =
κ2
ǫA(1− cosκ) . (21)
For example, for the parameter values used in Figure 2,
we have τc ≈ 400, whereas the relevant critical value for
Figure 1 is τc = 1.8 × 105. These values are in excellent
agreement with simulations.
Conclusion– We have introduced a simple thermal urn
model of competition between agents with memory. In-
creasing memory allows agents to more accurately de-
termine the most productive strategy, and reduces the
temperature of the model. However, if a sufficiently high
concentration of long memory agents is present a limit
cycle appears which reduces the competitiveness of long
memory agents, leading to self organized Hopf bifurcation
in a mixed memory model. The simplicity of our model,
its connection to classical urn models, together with the
fact that limit cycles arise naturally suggest it might be
fruitfully generalized, and employed to study a variety of
different games. For example our approach may be ap-
plied to the Rock Scissors Paper game [3], where agents,
interacting pairwise, recall their last τ interactions. Al-
though a larger memory provides better statistical data
on the optimal strategy, at critical memory a limit cycle
emerges about Nash equilibrium, destroying this compet-
itive advantage [27]. Other natural extensions include the
introduction of multiple urns to represent, for example,
different financial stocks. In this case we would expect
more complex patterns of oscillation [26]. Experimen-
tal research into the nature of human and animal mem-
ory [28–31] places emphasis on the “forgetting function”
which describes how memories decay with time. Such a
function, or greater powers of statistical inference, could
be naturally incorporated into our analysis, and its ef-
fects on stability explored.
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